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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-RELIGION
CLAUSES-STATE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS-The
United States Supreme Court held that a state's nondiscriminatory
imposition of sales and use tax of religious on religious organiza-
tion's sales of religious materials did not violate the Free Exercise
or Establishment Clauses.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization of Califor-
nia, 493 US __ , 110 S Ct 688 (1990).
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries ("Ministries") sold religous books,
cassette tapes, records and nonreligious merchandise worth
$1,943,502 to residents of California between 1974 and 1981.' Ap-
proximately 12% of the sales of religious and nonreligious mer-
chandise2 were made to residents of California during 23 evangelis-
tic crusades held during the seven year period.' The balance4 of
the merchandise was sold to residents of California through mail
orders and was shipped from Ministries' headquarters in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana.5 At the time of the sales, Ministries was a reli-
gious organization affiliated with the Assemblies of God Church'
and was recognized as a nonprofit religious organization under
Louisiana laws and by the Internal Revenue Service.7
In 1980, the Board of Equalization of California8 ("Board") ad-
vised Ministries that its sales of merchandise to residents of Cali-
fornia were subject to California sales and use tax.' California im-
poses a sales tax on all retailers selling tangible personal property
1. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization of California, 493 US __,
110 S Ct 688, 692 (1990).
2. The actual amount was $240,560.00. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 692.
3. Id at 691.
4. The actual balance was $1,702,942.00. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 692.
5. Id. Merchandise was advertised through Ministries' monthly magazine, The Evan-
gelist. Id.
6. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization of California, 204 Cal App 3d
1269, 250 Cal Rptr 891 (1988).
7. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 691. Ministries applied in 1980 to change its federal tax ex-
emption from a religious organization to a church, based on holding church services at its
headquarters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The Internal Revenue Service granted the change
in 1982, making it retroactive to 1980. Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at 893, n.1.
8. The Board of Equalization is responsible for overseeing imposition of sales, use and
property taxes by tax officials of the state, county and city. Cal Govt Code § 15606 (West
1990). It also hears appeals by taxpayers regarding the imposition of those taxes.
9. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 692.
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in the state."° A tax is also imposed on out of state purchases of
tangible personal property made by California residents for use,
consumption or storage in California." Religious organizations are
not exempted from these taxes under either the California Consti-
tution or the Sales and Use Tax law. 2
The Board notified Ministries of its responsibility to register as a
retailer for reporting and paying the sales and use tax.13 Ministries
asserted that the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States 4 exempted it from imposition of the tax.' 5 The
Board advised Ministries that there was no exemption from sales
taxes on religious materials.' a In 1981 an audit conducted by the
Board resulted in an assessment of $118,294.54 in sales and use
tax.' 7 Ministries petitioned the Board for a redetermination based
on its alleged exemption from the tax.'" After a hearing and an
appeal to the Board, the penalty was removed but the taxes and
interest were not adjusted.'" Ministries paid the taxes and interest
and filed for redetermination and a refund. ° The Board denied
this petition." '
In an appeal of the Board's decision before Superior Court, San
Diego County, California, Ministries was denied a refund and Min-
istries appealed." The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
Division 1 affirmed, holding that the taxes did not violate the Free
Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the
10. Id. "For the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail a tax is hereby
imposed upon all retailers ... [on] the gross receipts of any retailer from the sale of all
tangible property sold at retail in this state... " Cal Rev & Tax Code§ 6051 (West 1987).
11. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 691. "An excise tax is hereby imposed on the storage, use, or
other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any re-
tailer. " Cal Rev & Tax Code § 6201 (West 1987).
12. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 691.
13. Id at 692. The Board also adopted the position that Ministries had a sufficient
nexus with the State of California for the state to require Ministries to collect and report
use tax on its mail-order sales to California purchasers. Id.
14. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. ..." US Const, Amend I.
15. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 692.
16. Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at 894.
17. Id. Interest of $36,021.11 and penalties of $11,829.45 were also assessed. Id.
18. Id. Ministries and the Board stipulated that Ministries could eliminate its contest
of the taxability of items which Ministries said did not have specific religious-message con-
tent. Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at 893, n.3.
19. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 692.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at 894.
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U.S. Constitution.23 The California Supreme Court refused to
grant a discretionary review.24 The Supreme Court of the United
States noted probable jurisdiction 25  under 28 USC section
1257(2).2e
A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice
O'Connor, concluded that the sales and use tax imposed on Minis-
tries did not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or the Estab-
lishment Clause.27 The Court declined to review the merits of Min-
istries' claim that the use tax violated the Commerce Clause and
the Due Process Clauses because the lower courts had ruled the
claim was procedurally barred.2
In determining whether the California tax violated the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment,29 the Court stated that its
Free Exercise inquiry would be guided by Hernandez v Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue.30 In Hernandez the Supreme Court
applied a balancing test in which a regulation's "substantial bur-
den" on a central religious belief or practice is weighed against the
strength of the government interest.31 The state action could be
found not to violate the Free Exercise Clause if the action involved
a compelling government interest.
32
23. Id at 891.
24. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 692.
25. Id.
26. Id. 28 USC section 1257(2) provides in pertinent part that
[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a deci-
sion could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
28 USC § 1257(2). This paragraph was removed by the Supreme Court Selections Act en-
acted on June 27, 1988, with the effective date being September 25, 1988. Supreme Court
Selections Act, Pub L No 100-352, 102 Stat 662 (1988). Any judgment previously appealable
under paragraph (2) that had been entered before the effective date could still be heard by
the Supreme Court. Since the California Court of Appeal entered judgment on the instant
case on August 29, 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States allowed the appeal not-
withstanding the Supreme Court Selections Act.
27. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 699. See note 14 for text of First Amendment.
28. Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at 906-07. The lower courts found that Ministries had
failed to preserve this claim in its initial appeal of the Board's decision. Id.
29. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 693. ". . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law. US Const, Amend XIV §1.
30. 490 US-., 109 S Ct 2136 (1989).
31.. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 693.
32. Id. This balancing test had its origins in Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599 (1961).
See note 101.
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In its free exercise argument, Ministries relied on Murdock v
Pennsylvania"3 and Follett v McCormick.3 4 These cases arose from
challenges by Jehovah's Witnesses of license fees on all persons
canvassing or soliciting within a city.3 5 The United States Supreme
Court held the taxes in Murdock and Follett to be unconstitu-
tional violations of the Free Exercise Clause. 6 Ministries argued
that these decisions extended to the California sales and use tax as
burdens on the "evangelical distribution of religious materials."37
The Supreme Court determined that the application of the Mur-
dock and Follett decisions was limited to flat license taxes which
served as prior restraints on the free exercise of religious liberty.38
The California sales and use tax, under the Court's analysis, was
not a flat tax, represented only a small proportion of the sale price
of the merchandise, and was nondiscriminatory in application to
all retail sales.3 9 In addition, the sales and use tax was found not to
act as a prior restraint because there was no fee charged to register
as a retailer. The tax also posed no prior restraint because it was
imposed regardless of registration or failure to register and the tax
was collected after the sale, and not as a condition of being allowed
to deliver a religious message.4 The Court thus distinguished the
California tax from the taxes in Murdock and Follett.4
.With no evidence to show that paying the taxes would violate
Ministries' sincerely held religious beliefs,42 the Court also rejected
the claim raised by Ministries under Sherbert v Verner43 that the
33. 319 US 105 (1943).
34. 321 US 573 (1944).
35. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 693. In 1942, one year before Murdock, the Supreme Court
in Jones v Opelika, 316 US 584 (1942) had upheld the constitutionality of license fees simi-
lar to the ones in Murdock. When the Court heard Murdock, Opelika was reargued, be-
cause of its precedential effect on Murdock. In its original decision in Opelika, the Supreme
Court concluded that a state could charge a license fee for canvassing because the Jehovah's
Witnesses had used commercial means to raise funds for evangelical use. The Court, upon
rehearing, vacated its previous decision, stating, "the mere fact that religious literature is
'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism into a
commercial enterprise. Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 110." Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at
895-896.
36. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 693-694.
37. Id at 693. Ministries argued that paying the tax would place an economic burden
on its ability to spread its religious message. Ministries, 250 Cal Rptr at 897.
38. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 694.
39. Id at 695.
40. Id at 696.
41. Id at 695.
42. Id at 696.
43. 374 US 398 (1963).
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tax would place Ministries under substantial pressure to modify its
behavior."" The Court compared the effect of a "generally applica-
ble" sales and use tax to other "generally applicable" laws and reg-
ulations, such as health and safety, which religious organizations
were obliged to observe.45 The Court concluded that the general
nature of the tax prevented violation of the Free Exercise Clause.' 6
In considering whether the tax violated the Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court applied the standard developed in
Lemon v Kurtzman. 7 The Court noted that the Establishment
Clause prohibits excessive involvement of government in religion,
and, therefore, reviewed Ministries' contention that the application
of California's sales and use tax fostered excessive government en-
tanglement.48 The government entanglement questioned involved
the inspections of the Ministries' crusades, audits, examination of
books, and administrative and judicial proceedings.49 The Court
examined the application of the tax using the three prong test of
Lemon,50 and concluded that the sales and use tax met all three
prongs without violating the Establishment Clause. 1
The Court found no excessive entanglement. The tax did not im-.
pose any burdens on Ministries' accounting systems and, even if it
did, the burdens would not be constitutionally significant.52 The
routine "administration of neutral tax laws"53 was not so invasive
as to constitute excessive entanglement.5 ' The application of the
tax to all sales of items regardless of the motive for selling them or
their content avoided the types of decisions most likely to foster
excessive entanglement.55
44. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 697.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 403 US 602 (1971). Frequently referred to as the "Lemon test."
48. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 698.
49. Id at 697.
50. The three prong test is that the state action should: have a secular purpose;
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and not foster excessive government entanglement in
religion. Lemon, 403 US at 612-13.
51. Id at 698.
52. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 698. "[W]e have held that generally applicable administra-
tive and record keeping regulations may be imposed on religious organizations without run-
ning afoul of the Establishment Clause." Id (referring to Hernandez, 109 S Ct at 2147).
53. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 699.
54. Id. In the previous term of the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 489
US-., 109 S Ct 890 (1989), a plurality of the Court held that a state's sales tax exemption
for religious publications was a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
55. Swaggart, 110 S Ct at 695. "From the State's point of view, the critical question is
not whether the materials are religious, but whether there is a sale or a use, a question
1990
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Ministries asserted that donations often were mixed with pay-
ments for religious items and that the separation of sales receipts
from donations would be burdensome. 6 However, the Court rea-
soned that Ministries' use of order forms and prices made separa-
tion possible and necessary for other purposes. 7 Thus, the Court
found no basis for determining that there was excessive govern-
ment entanglement as Ministries claimed.5 8
The Supreme Court held that the California sales and use tax
did not impose a constitutionally significant burden on Ministries'
religious practices and beliefs. The Free Exercise Clause did not
require California to grant an exemption to Ministries.59 Having
found no excessive government entanglement, the Court held that
the tax did not violate the Establishment Clause." Ministries' ap-
peal for refund of the tax was denied and the judgment of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal was affirmed.6
The language of the Religion Clauses has been described as, "at
best opaque."62 This reputed opaqueness may explain why Chief
Justice Warren Burger characterized the history of the Supreme
Court's opinions on the Religion Clauses as internally inconsistent
because general principles have been formulated on a case by case
basis.6 The internal inconsistency has been reflected in a vacilla-
tion between principles of neutrality, 4 and preferred position. 5
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, although inter-
twined, are frequently considered separately by the Supreme
which involves only a secular determination." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id at 698.
58. Id at 699. "Ironically, appellant's theory, under which government may not tax
'religious core' activities, but may tax 'nonreligious' activities, would require government to
do precisely what appellant asserts the Religion Clauses prohibit: 'determine which expendi-
tures are religious and which are secular.' Lemon, 403 US at 621-622, 91 S Ct at 2115-2116."
Id.
59. Id at 697.
60. Id at 695.
61. Id at 701.
62. Lemon, 403 US at 612.
63. Walz v Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 US 664, 668 (1970). This char-
acterization is supported by Philip B. Kurland, who said that there is no consistency in the
Court's opinions regarding the Religion Clauses. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State
and the Supreme Court, 29 U Chi L Rev 1, 96 (Autumn 1961).
64. "The principle of strict neutrality assumes that all aspects of religion that are ap-
propriately subject to governmental regulation or support will always fall within some larger
secular category .. " Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doc-
trinal Development, Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv L Rev 513, 527
(January, 1968).
65. See note 75.
170 Vol. 29:165
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Court. Different standards have been developed for each Clause.
Vacillation between neutrality and preferred position has contrib-
uted to erratic development of the standards. The result has been
three standards for the Free Exercise Clause: 1) absolute immunity
for religious beliefs and no immunity for conduct; 2) preferred po-
sition for religion with immunity for some forms of religious con-
duct; 3) balancing test in which a compelling state interest can jus-
tify infringement on religious liberty.
Initially the Court distinguished religious beliefs and conduct,
however, it later adopted the preferred position standard. Almost
50 years have been spent trying to limit and redefine this standard.
Without explicitly rejecting the preferred position standard, a bal-
ancing test was developed in 1961 which takes into account the
burden which state action imposes on religious liberty and whether
the state has a compelling interest in such regulation. While di-
verging from the preferred position standard, the balancing test
has reflected preferred position to some extent through factors
such as reasonable accommodation of religious conduct.
The standard used for Establishment Clause purposes emerged
from a neutrality principle. As the Supreme Court attempted to
inject more flexibility for religious organizations utilizing a doc-
trine of benevolent neutrality, that standard was modified to the
current Lemon test. Recently, members of the Court have ques-
tioned whether the modification has reduced the flexibility of the
standard.
Free Exercise: Distinction Between Belief and Conduct
Almost 100 years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
Supreme Court issued its first opinion regarding the Free Exercise
Clause in Reynolds v United States.6 6 In that case, the protection
under the First Amendment for free exercise of religion was held
to extend only to religious belief while conduct which violated so-
cial norms or threatened public order could still be regulated by
acts of Congress.6 ' The absolute immunity for beliefs and the def-
erence accorded regulation of conduct prevailed until 1940 when
Cantwell v Connecticut"8 presented the Court's conclusion that the
Free Exercise Clause applied to state action through the Four-
66. 98 US 145 (1878). A member of the Mormon Church challenged his conviction for
polygamy on free exercise grounds. Reynolds, 98 US at 145.
67. Id at 164. At this time the Free Exercise Clause was not applied to state action.
68. 310 US 296 (1940). A member of the Jehovah's Witnesses arrested while going
door to door soliciting contributions in return for literature challenged his conviction for
breach of the peace on free exercise grounds. Cantwell, 310 US at 296.
1990
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teenth Amendment and that the Free Exercise Clause limited the
state's ability to regulate conduct which was based on religious be-
lief. 9 State regulation of religious conduct could not unduly in-
fringe upon religious beliefs.70 Blurring the distinction made in
Reynolds between religious beliefs and conduct, the Court in
Cantwell took the first step in development of a standard for con-
stitutionally protected religious conduct.
Shortly after the decision in Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness chal-
lenged his conviction for selling books without a license in Jones v
Opelika.7' The City of Opelika required a license and charged a fee
of $5.00 per year for transient book agents or distributors. 72 A dis-
tinction was made by the Court between a nondiscriminatory regu-
lation and tax as compared to those which might be imposed on
religious rites.73 A majority of five justices held that a nondiscrimi-
natory regulation of this type did not unduly infringe upon reli-
gious beliefs and, therefore, was not a violation of free exercise.
714
Protection against undue infringement was based on a neutrality
principle of nondiscriminatory regulation. However, that position
was not to prevail. Chief Justice Stone in his dissent, proposed
that the First Amendment placed the freedom of religion in a
"preferred position" which should exempt religious activity from
even a nondiscriminatory regulation. 75 Chief Justice Stone's posi-
tion was to prevail a year later when Opelika was reconsidered by
the Supreme Court.76
One year later in Murdock v Pennsylvania,77 Jehovah's Wit-
69. Id at 303-04.
70. Id. A Connecticut statute which regulated solicitations for religious or charitable
causes was held to be unconstitutional. The statute required prior approval of a cause as
religious or charitable before solicitation would be allowed. Id at 301-05.
71. 316 US 584 (1942).
72. Id at 586.
73. Id at 596.
74. Id. "To subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for their money-
making activities does not require a finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It
is enough that the money is earned by the sale of articles." Id at 596-97.
75. Id at 608 (Stone dissenting). "The First Amendment is not confined to safeguard-
ing freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them
out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
has put those freedoms in a preferred position." Id. When the Supreme Court heard Mur-
dock in 1943, the approval of nondiscriminatory regulations in Opelika would have been
controlling because of the similarity of the licensing regulations in these cases. However, the
Court decided to rehear arguments in Opelika, vacated its judgment and determined that
the licensing fees violated the Free Exercise Clause.
76. See note 35 regarding rehearing of Opelika when Murdock was heard.
77. 319 US 105 (1943).
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nesses, going door to door in Jeanette, Pennsylvania, distributing
literature and soliciting payments for the literature, were convicted
for violating an ordinance requiring a license.7" Murdock raised the
same issue as Opelika regarding the constitutionality of a license
fee as applied to the Witnesses' free exercise rights. The canvass-
ing was characterized as religious activity occupying, "the same
high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits." 9 Thus, Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, found the regulation of the activity to be
an undue infringement on religious freedom ° and the Court held
that it violated the Witnesses' free exercise rights.8'
This adoption of the preferred position standard which Chief
Justice Stone had advocated was not meant to preclude all oppor-
tunities for the state to impose taxes on religious groups.82 The dis-
tinction was drawn between a tax imposed for the privilege of ex-
ercising a protected freedom such as relgious beliefs and a
nondiscriminatory tax imposed on a religious group's general activ-
ities, such as on the income and property of a minister.8 3 In his
dissent, Justice Frankfurter described the holding as offending the
First Amendment requirement of separation of church and state,
which the majority opinion sought to protect by requiring the state
to subsidize religious activity. 4
Subsequently, Follett, a Jehovah's Witness and resident of the
town of McCormick, South Carolina, challenged his conviction for
distribution of literature under a licensing ordinance similar to
that in Murdock.8 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court distin-
guished Follett from Murdock finding that Murdock referred to
itinerant evangelists and Follett, on the other hand, was distribut-
ing literature in McCormick where he resided. 6 The Supreme
Court of the United States found in Follett the same issue as in
Murdock: whether the license tax unduly infringed on religious be-
liefs.8 7 The Murdock precedent was determined to be controlling
78. Murdock, 319 US at 106. The fee for the license was $1.50 per day to $20.00 for
three weeks. Id.
79. Id at 109.
80. Id at 112.
81. Id at 117.
82. Id at 112.
83. Id at 112-13.
84. Id at 139-40 (Frankfurter dissenting).
85. FoUett v Town of McCormick, 321 US 573, 574-575 (1944).
86. Follet, 321 US at 574-75.
87. Id at 577.
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and the licensing ordinance in Follett was held to be in violation of
the Free Exercise Clause.""
Justice Murphy's concurrence in Follett presented further argu-
ment for religion's preferred position. He questioned the difference
between taxes on commercial activity and taxes "on an activity
that is essentially religious in nature."'89 The power to levy taxes in
the second situation invested the state with the power "to suppress
freedoms and destroy religion.''90
Opelika, Murdock and Follett made flat license fees or taxes un-
constitutional because they were or could become burdens on the
free exercise of religion. These decisions extended the Cantwell
position that the state could not unduly infringe upon conduct
based on religious beliefs. The three cases established that the
First Amendment conferred a preferred position on some forms of
religious activity, providing them with immunity even from non-
discriminatory regulation, regardless of whether they took on the
appearance of commercial activity.2 The limited immunity which
Cantwell provided for religious conduct had expanded under Mur-
dock almost to the absolute immunity which had been accorded to
beliefs. The preferred position standard conveyed protection for
religious conduct elevating it above private property rights.
In 1945, the Court heard the argument of a Jehovah's Witness
who claimed that her free exercise rights had been violated by an
Alabama statute making it a crime to be on the premises of an-
other after being warned to stay off.93 The Witness had been ar-
rested and convicted under the statute while she was distributing
religious literature on the streets of a town owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation. 4 Following Murdock, the Court deter-
mined that the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause when ap-
plied to this person" despite the private ownership of the prop-
erty. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, emphasized
88. Id at 578. "[T]o say that they, like other citizens, may be subject to general taxa-
tion does not mean that they can be required to pay a tax for the exercise of that which the
First Amendment has made a high constitutional privilege." Id.
89. Id at 579 (Murphy concurring).
90. Id.
91. Freedom of speech and press were also at issue in the three cases, but the Supreme
Court's discussion of the free exercise issue predominated the opinions.
92. Murdock, 319 US at 115; Follett, 321 US at 575.
93. Marsh v Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946).
94. Marsh, 326 US at 502-03.
95. Id at 504, n.1.
96. Id at 509.
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the preferred position principle of Murdock as justification for
placing the Witness' free exercise rights over the protection of pri-
vate property.
9 7
Free Exercise: Religious Liberty and Compelling State Interests
In 1961 the Supreme Court presented a balancing test for Free
Exercise which limited the virtual immunity that preferred posi-
tion had given to religious conduct. Members of the Orthodox Jew-
ish faith challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Sunday
Closing Law on free exercise grounds.9 s Returning to the limited
immunity which Cantwell provided for conduct, the Supreme
Court considered whether the Sunday Closing Law unduly in-
fringed on religious liberty." The Court found that the general
public interest in one day of rest per week justified the law. Remi-
niscent of the Court's initial support for nondiscriminatory regula-
tion in Opelika, the Court determined that unless the state can
achieve its purpose by other non-burdening means, the state may
regulate conduct through a general law, secular in nature, even
though it may impose an indirect burden on religious activity.100
The Court was moving away from the principle of preferred posi-
tion with a balancing test. 0 '
The balancing test was explicitly presented in Sherbert v Ver-
ner 0 2 when the Court reversed the lower courts in South Carolina
in an unemployment compensation case. 03 Sherbert, a member of
the Seventh Day Adventist Church had been denied benefits under
unemployment compensation because she would not accept jobs
which required her to work on Saturday (the Sabbath Day of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church). 04 She challenged application of
the South Carolina statute to her as abridging the free exercise of
97. Id at 510 (Frankfurter concurring).
98. Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599 (1961).
99. Braunfeld, 366 US at 603-4.
100. Id at 607.
101. Id at 606. "To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which
imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not
make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of
the legislature." Id. In Braunfeld, the Court attempted to bring the holdings in Murdock
and Follett within the principle of neutrality by suggesting that the ordinances in those
cases were struck down, "because the State's interest, the obtaining of revenue, could be
easily satisfied by imposing this tax on nonreligious sources." Id at 607, n.4. However, the
Court's discussion of the license tax in Murdock concentrates on its function as a tax on the
exercise of a privilege and does not raise the issue of the state's interest in revenue. Mur-
dock, 319 US at 114-15.
102. 374 US 398 (1963).
103. Sherbert, 374 US at 410.
104. Id at 399-401.
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her religion.10 5 Although the situation was similar to that in
Braunfeld, the Court distinguished the cases on the basis of.the
strength of the state's interest. The interest in a uniform day of
rest was found to be stronger than the interest of the state in un-
employment compensation benefits. 10 6 In articulating the standard
for analyzing the statute in Sherbert, the Court inquired: does the
statute impose a burden on the free exercise of religion10 7 and is
the burden justified by a compelling state interest.108 The Supreme
Court concluded that a worker's day of rest must be respected in
determining eligibility for unemployment compensation.10 9 After
20 years of preferred position for religious conduct, the Supreme
Court supported its application of the balancing test in Sherbert as
upholding the "governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of
religious differences ."110 The Court presented Murdock and
Follett as standing for protection of religious beliefs (instead of
conduct) against government regulation.1 Thus, the decisions did
not have to consider the state's interest in regulating conduct as
Braunfeld and Sherbert had.
Nine years later the Court would characterize Murdock as a case
standing for freedom of religious conduct in Wisconsin v Yoder.'. 2
In Yoder, parents who refused to send their children to school be-
cause of their Amish faith were convicted of violating Wisconsin's
law requiring school attendance. ' 3 The parents challenged their
convictions on free exercise grounds, claiming their religious beliefs
required them to remove their children from school after comple-
tion of the eighth grade.1 4 Applying the balancing test from Sher-
bert, the Court determined that the Wisconsin law infringed on the
parents' free exercise rights." 5 While Wisconsin argued that its in-
terest in compulsory public education was compelling,1 the Court
set that interest aside, citing Murdock, Cantwell and Sherbert as
providing that there are areas of religious conduct which cannot be
105. Id at 401.
106. Id at 408-9.
107. Id at 403.
108. Id.
109. Id at 410.
110. Id at 409.
111. Id at 402.
112. 406 US 205 (1972).
113. Yoder, 406 US at 207.
114. Id at 208-09.
115. Id at 215, 218.
116. Id at 221.
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regulated even under generally applicable laws.' 7 Referring to the
effect of accommodating the religious beliefs of the Amish, the
Court concluded that the state's interest would not be impaired by
accommodation.' " The Wisconsin law as applied to Amish families
was held to be unconstitutional." 9
The balancing test of compelling government interests in regu-
lating conduct as weighed against their infringement on free exer-
cise of religion was applied in United States v Lee. 2 ° An Old Or-
der Amish employer challenged the imposition of Social Security
taxes on him and his Amish employees, arguing that their religious
beliefs required them to care for their own poor and elderly with-
out reliance on Social Security.' 2 ' Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, inquired whether the Social Security taxes and bene-
fits interfered with the Amish's free exercise rights.'2 2 After finding
an interference, Chief Justice Burger determined the government's
interest in a mandatory social security system was "very high." '23
The compelling interest in a comprehensive social security system
outweighed the burden imposed on religious beliefs. 24 Finally, the
possibility of some accommodation of the religious beliefs which
would not interfere with the governmental interest was raised, cit-
ing Braunfeld. 25 However, accommodation was determined to be
impracticable,' 26 and the Social Security tax as applied to Amish
employers was held to be constitutional.'27
In 1989, members of the Church of Scientology challenged a de-
termination by the Internal Revenue Service that their payments
to the Church for "auditing" and "training" sessions were not de-
ductible contributions.2 8 One of their contentions was that the de-
117. Id at 220.
118. Id at 228-29. Accommodation of religious beliefs in this case meant that the
Amish children could be excused from school without doing injury to the purpose of the
state's interest. Id.
119. Id at 234.
120. 455 US 252 (1982).
121. Lee, 455 US at 255.
122. Id at 256-57.
123. Id at 258-59.
124. Id at 260.
125. Id at 259.
126. Id at 260-61. But the consideration of accommodation seemed to conform to the
Murdock policy of preferred position.
127. Id at 261.
128. Hernandez v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 US __, 109 S Ct 2136
(1989). Auditing and training are terms applied by church members to a form of spiritual




termination of the IRS placed a significant burden on the practice
of their religion: the disallowance of the deduction would deter
members from involvement in auditing and training.'29 The bal-
ancing test from Sherbert and Yoder was applied and the burden
was found to be either not substantial, or even if substantial, the
government's interest in a generally applicable tax system was
compelling and justified the burden.
30
Establishment Clause: Separation and Benevolent Neutrality
In Everson v Board of Education,13 ' a New Jersey taxpayer chal-
lenged the validity of that state's statute authorizing reimburse-
ment to parents for public transportation fares of students in pri-
vate and public schools (including religious schools). 32 Justice
Black, in the opinion for the majority, referred to the wall of sepa-
ration which the First Amendment erected between church and
state. 3 He stated that the First Amendment requires the state to
take a position of neutrality with regard to religion."3 This posi-
tion of neutrality would not, however, require the state to withhold
from religious groups benefits which are necessary to the achieve-
ment of the state's general interest in public safety, health and
welfare. 3 5 Finding that New Jersey had a general interest in the
safety of school children, the Court upheld the statute as not viola-
tive of the Establishment Clause.
3
6
The next year, the Court was asked to test the wall of separation
again when a school system allowed religious teachers to use public
school classrooms to teach religious classes during regular school
hours. 13 7 The Court considered this to be a clear example of gov-
ernment aid to religion which was denied under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 3 8 Justice Frankfurter, in a con-
curring opinion, underscored the absolute separation called for in
the First Amendment.
13 9
129. Id at 2148. Establishment Clause arguments in the case will be discussed below.
130. Id at 2148-49.
131. 330 US 1 (1947).
132. Everson, 330 US at 3.
133. Id at 16 (citing Reynolds, 98 US at 164).
134. Everson, 330 US at 18.
135. Id at 16-7.
136. Id.
137. McCollum v Board of Education, 333 US 203 (1948).
138. McCollum, 333 US at 210.




In Zorach v Clauson14 ° four years later, the Court held as consti-
tutional a New York City released time program which allowed
school children to leave the public schools during regular hours for
religious instruction."" Unlike McCollum, Zorach did not involve
direct government aid to religion. There was neither religious in-
struction in the schools nor expenditures of public funds for reli-
gious purposes. 142 Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, pointed out
the indirect use of the compulsory public education program as co-
ercion to secure children's attendance for religious instruction.
143
Neutrality was further supported by the decision in Abington
School District v Schempp'" Therein, a Pennsylvania law requir-
ing the reading of at least 10 verses from the Bible at opening exer-
cises at school was challenged under the Establishment Clause. 45
Following Everson and Zorach as standing for a neutral position,
the Court further described how the First Amendment called for
neutrality.' The opinion went on to formulate a test which would
be the basis for determining the outcome in Schempp and from
which later tests would be developed: "what are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment?' 1 47 The purpose must be sec-
ular and the primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit reli-
gion for the regulation to comport with the Establishment
Clause. 148 Applying this test to the required Bible reading, the
Court found the Pennsylvania law to have a religious purpose and
to advance religion.'49 Thus, the statute was held to be in violation
140. 343 US 306 (1952).
141. Zorach, 343 US at 314. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion for the majority (as
he had in Murdock and Follett) stating, "[W]e find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion. Id.
142. Id at 308-09.
143. Id at 322-23 (Franfurter dissenting).
144. 374 US 203 (1963).
145. Schempp, 374 US at 205.
146. Id at 222.
The wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a recog-
nition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a
fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one
upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies. This the Establishment
Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise
Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance and,
more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with refer-




149. Id at 224.
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of the Establishment Clause.15
In 1970 the Supreme Court moved away from the neutrality
principle in Walz v Tax Commission of City of New York, wherein
a New York statute which exempted church property from real es-
tate tax was challenged as violating the Establishment Clause.1'5
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, raised the long his-
tory of property tax exemptions for churches.' 52 He summed up
the history of the First Amendment as having no toleration for
governmental establishment of religion nor for governmental inter-
ference with religion. 5 From this summary, Chief Justice Burger
presented the concept of "benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference."1
54
Stating that benevolent neutrality would operate within the pol-
icy of neutrality, Chief Justice Burger examined the wall of separa-
tion argument in Everson where the state had nevertheless been
allowed to pay transportation expenses for children in religious
schools. 55 He discussed Zorach where the compulsory attendance
laws could be used to support children attending religious classes
held off school grounds during school hours. 5 These cases more
closely reflected a benevolent neutrality than a strict neutrality,
according to the Chief Justice.
1 57
Benevolent neutrality, which allowed, "room for play in the
joints,"'158 a history of real estate tax exemptions for religious
groups dating from 1800,1'1 and tax exemptions of this type in each
of the 50 states,'60 provided support for the conclusion that the
exemptions passed the Schempp test - that the exemption fosters
a secular purpose and that its effect neither advances nor inhibits
religion.' 6' Chief Justice Burger added to the test a third prong:
that the regulation should not result in "excessive government en-
150. Id at 225.
151. 397 US 664 (1970). The exemption required that the property be owned by a
religious association exclusively for religious purposes and be used exclusively for carrying
out such purposes. Walz, 397 US at 666.
152. Id at 677-69.
153. Id at 669.
154. Id.
155. Id at 669-71.
156. Id at 672.
157. Id.
158. Id at 669.
159. Id at 677.
160. Id at 676.
161. Id at 672.
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tanglement with religion."' 2 Finding that the exemption created a
minimal involvement and reinforced the separation sought under
the First Amendment,'63 the exemption was upheld.
64
After adding the excessive entanglement prong to the secular
purpose and primary effect prongs from Schempp, Chief Justice
Burger applied this test when he delivered the opinion for the
Court in Lemon v Kurtzman."5 A Pennsylvania law which allowed
reimbursement for the costs of private (including religious) schools
in teaching certain secular subjects had been challenged as violat-
ing the Establishment Clause. 6 6 The statute was analyzed under
the three prong test.6 7
Deference was given to. the state legislature's express statement
of a secular purpose.' The precautions taken under the statute to
avoid advancing or inhibiting religion were noted,'69 but the nature
of the precautions brought the statutory program into conflict with
the excessive entanglement prong. 7 ° The Pennsylvania statute fos-
tered excessive entanglement through the limits which it sought to
impose on any religious teaching being done in the reimbursed
subjects, the accounting required of the religious schools, and the
requirement that materials be approved by state officials.' Be-
cause of this excessive entanglement, the Court did not need to
examine the primary effect. The statute was held to violate the
Establishment Clause. 72
162. Id at 674.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect eco-
nomic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser involvement than taxing
them. In analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the involvement is
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for officiai and continuing sur-
veillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.
Id at 674-75.
163. Id at 676.
164. Id at 680.
165. 403 US 602 (1971).
166. Lemon, 403 US at 609-10. Reimbursable costs included teachers' salaries, instruc-
tional materials and textbooks. Id.
167. Id at 612-13.
168. Id at 613.
169. Id.
170. Id at 620-21.
171. Id at 621. The entanglement prong became an integral part of the test for state
action challenged under the Establishment Clause. It came to be so widely used without
leaving any room for play in the joints that Chief Justice Burger became critical of the
Court's, "obsession with the criteria identified in Lemon v Kurtzman." Aguilar v Felton,
473 US 402, 419 (1985) (Burger dissenting). See also Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 84-90
(1985) (Burger dissenting).
172. Id at 625. The inconsistency between the primary effect prong and the excessive
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In Aguilar v Felton,'173 the Lemon test was applied to New York
City's publicly funded program of remedial education for children
in private schools, many of which were religiously affiliated. 174 The
program included a supervisory system designed to prevent the use
of public funds to advance religion. 175 However, the supervision
brought the program into conflict with the Establishment Clause
because the extent of the supervision created excessive entangle-
ment. 17  The supervision included agents of the City visiting and
inspecting religious schools regularly. Repeated contacts occurred
between the religious school teachers and the remedial education
teachers. Administrative personnel in the two systems had to work
together to coordinate schedules and resolve problems. 177 Excessive
entanglement meant the program was unconstitutional.1
7
1
With Lemon and Aguilar setting the threshhold for excessive en-
tanglement, Hernandez suggested what is not excessive. The mem-
bers of the Church of Scientology claimed that the distinction be-
tween charitable gifts to religious organizations and payments for
services, which the Internal Revenue Service had made, involved
excessive entanglement. Entanglement would occur in distinguish-
ing between gifts and payments as well as in placing values on the
religious services purchased.' 79 Acknowledging that the IRS would
have to make some determinations about value, the Court said
such involvement was not excessive. 80
Also in 1989, the Court held in Texas Monthly, Inc. v Bullock'"'
that a state sales tax exemption for religious publications violated
entanglement prong has received attention within the Court. The problem arises because a
state's good faith efforts to avoid advancement of religion may result in excessive entangle-
ment. Aguilar, 473 US at 429-431 (O'Connor dissent).
173. 473 US 402 (1985).
174. Aguilar, 473 US at 409.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id at 413.
178. Id at 410.
179. Hernandez, 490 US ._,_109 S Ct at 2146. Justice O,Connor in dissent pointed
out other quid pro quo arrangements which the IRS treated as charitable gifts - pew rents,
Mass stipends, synagogue tickets for seats on Jewish High Holy Days. Hernandez, 109 S Ct
at 2154 (O'Connor dissenting).
180. Id at 2147. "But routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into
religious doctrine [citation omitted], no delegation of state power to a religious body [cita-
tion omitted], and no detailed monitoring and close administrative contact between secular
and religious bodies [citation omitted], does not of itself violate the nonentanglement com-
mand." Id.
181. __ U.S. -, 109 S Ct 890 (1989).
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the Establishment Clause. 182 The sales tax exemption had been
challenged by a nonreligious publication. The state of Texas con-
tended that the exemption was supported by Murdock and Follett
(on free exercise grounds) and by Walz (on avoidance of excessive
entanglement).' 83
The risk that removing the exemption would violate the Free
Exercise Clause based on Murdock was addressed by the Court
through another effort to limit Murdock. Pointing out, "some un-
necessarily sweeping statements,"' 8 in Murdock and Follett, the
Court disavowed those statements. 85 In so doing, the Court
presented a neutrality principle as guiding its decisions instead of
the Murdock principle of preferred position. The Court distin-
guished the license tax in Murdock and Follett as a "facially neu-
tral" tax which might still be violative of the Free Exercise Clause
because of its function as a precondition for engaging in religious
activity.188
The property tax exemption in Walz was distinguished from the
Texas sales tax exemption, not on the basis of benevolent neutral-
ity, but on a neutrality argument that the benefits of the property
tax exemption extended to a large number of nonreligious organi-
zations as well.1 87 Finally, the excessive entanglement which might
result with the lifting of the Texas exemption was found not to
impede evangelical activities of religious groups because it did not
require the continuing surveillance with which Walz was con-
cerned.1 88 Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justice Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated that the holding in Texas
Monthly, Inc. repudiated Walz and moved away from benevolent
neutrality and reasonable accommodation of religion for which
Walz and its successors stood. 89
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries depended upon the sweeping state-
182. Texas Monthly, Inc., 109 S Ct at 903.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. "To the extent that our opinions in Murdock and Follett might be read, how-
ever, to suggest that the States and the Federal Government may never tax the sale of
religious or other publications, we reject those dicta." Id at 904.
186. Id.
187. Id at 897. Chief Justice Burger had gone to considerable effort in the opinion in
Walz to disclaim the need, "to justify the tax exemption on the social welfare services or
good works' that some churches perform." Walz, 397 US at 674.
188. Texas Monthly, Inc., 109 S Ct at 903.
189. Id at 912 (Scalia dissenting). Scalia included Sherbert, Yoder, and Zorach as
cases standing for reasonable accommodation. Id. Scalia acknowledged that Murdock and
Follett were "narrowly distinguishable." Id at 914 (Scalia dissenting).
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ments of Murdock and Follett regarding protection of religious
freedom to make its case for exemption from California's sales and
use tax. Those cases did not address sales taxes and had excluded
from their prohibition nondiscriminatory taxes on religious groups'
general activities. However, the preferred position of religion prin-
ciple for which Murdock and Follettstand, as well as the Supreme
Court's subsequent diversion into benevolent neutrality and rea-
sonable accommodation gave Ministries reason to expect that it
was exempt from the taxes.
What was overlooked by Ministries was that the Supreme Court
in 1961 with Braunfeld and in 1963 with Sherbert, tried to rede-
fine those sweeping statements from Murdock and Follett. Not un-
til 1989, after Ministries was involved in its appeal from the judg-
ment of the California Court of Appeal, did the Court finally
disavow those sweeping statements. After almost 50 years of drift-
ing away from the neutrality principle, the Court abandoned the
arguments of preferred position. The Court also tried to redefine
its decision in Walz to move away from benevolent neutrality. Al-
most without warning, the Supeme Court embraced neutrality as
regards "generally applicable regulations" with Texas Monthly,
Inc. followed soon by Hernandez and Swaggart.
This inconsistent redefining of such a fundamental principle
poses problems for legislatures which seek to enact laws that are
constitutional. Likewise, it leaves religious organizations uncertain
as to their rights and obligations. If one purpose of legal systems is
to permit people to know with reasonable certainty if their actions
conform to the law, then the vacillation of the Court on the Reli-
gion Clauses marks a failure to provide reasonable certainty.
Under a neutrality principle which allows generally applicable
laws to apply to religious and non-religious organizations, alike,
certainty exists because decisions are independent from the nature
of the organization. Under a preferred position principle such cer-
tainty does not exist because the courts must always determine if
the regulated organization is religious and, therefore, deserving of
some special protection. Making such a determination raises ques-
tions about sincerely held religious beliefs and the prospect of dis-
crimination between mainstream religions and unorthodox be-
liefs.1 90 Thus, the Supreme Court may become engaged in the same
190. Gianella, 80 Harv L Rev at 1381, (cited in note 64).
One of the drawbacks of the balancing approach is that it complicates the role of the
courts in dealing with religious liberty. Conversely, one of the virtues of the strict
neutrality approach is that neither the sincerity nor the importance of the individ-
Vol. 29:165
Recent Decisions
types of analysis which it has characterized as excessive govern-
ment entanglement in religion.
Had the neutrality principle which was applied in Opelika,
before that case was heard for reargument, been applied to Mur-
dock and Follett, the excursion of the Court onto the path of pre-
ferred position, benevolent neutrality and reasonable accommoda-
tion might have been avoided. As a result of that excursion and the
abrupt return to neutrality, 50 years of reliance by legislatures and
religious organizations on special tax exemptions may not stand up
to constitutional challenges.
In 1971 (one year after the Supreme Court upheld property tax
exemptions for religious organizations in Walz), the General As-
sembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania amended its sales
and use tax law. The amendments preserved the provisions of the
1963 statute granting an exemption from sales and use tax on
"[t]he sale at retail or use of religious publications sold by religious
groups and Bibles and religious articles." '91 This same type of ex-
emption was held to be unconstitutional in Texas Monthly, Inc.
Following this precedent, the Pennsylvania exemption would be
viewed as unconstitutional.
Texas Monthly, Inc. suggests that exemptions which states have
given to religious organizations may violate the Establishment
Clause unless they can be justified on grounds of general public
benefit. By the Court's redefining of its position in Walz, property
tax exemptions to religious organizations may be subject to recon-
sideration if the use does not produce a general public benefit. In
the absence of such benefit, a policy question arises as to whether
religious organizations should be subject to the same economic cir-
cumstances and resultant decision making as nonreligious organi-
zations. For example, should small, poor churches be forced to
close because they cannot pay property taxes? The likely result of
Swaggart, Texas Monthly, Inc. and Hernandez is more litigation
to determine the strength of this revitalized principle of neutrality.
With Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy
dissenting in Texas Monthly, Inc. and raising reasonable accom-
modation as an argument, the unanimous decision in Swaggart
does not close the door on the preferred position principle. Swag-
ual's religious beliefs need to be considered by the court; the constitutionality of gov-
ernment action turns entirely on its own character rather than on a comparative eval-
uation of the competing religious and public interests.
Id at 1388-89.
191. 72 Pa Cons Stat § 7204(28) (Purdon 1990).
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gart can be distinguished from Texas Monthly, Inc. The former
provides that generally applicable taxes on religious organizations
do not violate the Religion Clauses when there is no state exemp-
tion for religious organizations, such as Pennsylvania has adopted.
The latter challenges the constitutionality of exemptions such as
Pennsylvania has promulgated. The three dissenters in Texas
Monthly, Inc. may continue to raise preferred position arguments
when exemptions such as Pennsylvania's are reviewed by the
Court. Religious organizations and legislatures are left waiting for
challenges which may result in striking down exemptions which
have been relied upon for decades. Indeed, when local and state
governments are stretched to their financial limits, the prospect of
collecting sales taxes and property taxes from religious organiza-
tions instead of raising tax rates may be politically popular. This
has been the case with hospitals and other charitable organizations
which are being subjected to challenges to their exemptions from
property taxes.
The seemingly inconsequential, unanimous decision in Swaggart
is potentially the turning point for a new articulation of the princi-
ple of neutrality in the Religion Clauses. If the Supreme Court
continues to move away from preferred position and reasonable ac-
commodation for religion, then legislatures and religious organiza-
tions will have reasonable certainty to guide their decisions. How-
ever, given the Court's history in this area, there may well be a
lurking fear of more change.
Stephen Paul Paschall
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